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The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on
the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging
economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a
thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs
and managers in Tunisia. Setting up “ex-nihilo” ten TPs in Tunisia
in  the  mid-1990s  was  a  political  decision.  Having  signed  the
Treaty  of  Marrakesh  to  enter  in  a  Free  Trade  Zone  with  Arab
Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to
enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to
boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and
with  other  Arab  states.  As  a  response  Technoparks  started
burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such
as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic
diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and
boosting  regional  development.
In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).  Six other TPs
followed  suit  in  various  priority  areas  like  biotechnology,
energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia’s
eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs
in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only
El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction
between  government,  higher  education  institutions  and
multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role
in  attracting  multinationals.  They  also  effectively  linked
Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of
production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly
skilled  researchers  and  a  local  labour  market.  The  other  TPs
failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites.
This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing
country  like  Tunisia  was  quite  unrealistic.  A  better  strategy
would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres
of excellence such as performing universities or industrial zones
and leverage the diaspora more effectively.
1 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s),
they do not necessarily represent the views of the African Development Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or
the countries they represent and should not be attributed to them.
Technoparks,  Centers  of  Excellence,  Science,  Technology  and
Innovation,  Research  and  Development  spillovers,  Industrial
Policy, Tunisia
1. Introduction
Are science parks2 high tech fantasies? This question by Massey et al. (1992) nearly two
decades ago is still valid today. There is a heated debate in the field of Science, Technology
and  Innovation  on  the  effectiveness  of  Technoparks  (TPs).  Since  the  1970s,  developed
countries  like  the  USA,  France,  Japan,  UK and Italy,  have  implemented  TPs to  promote
economic growth and foster technology-based sectors.3 In the last 20 years, developing and
emerging countries in Africa and Asia are beginning to replicate the TP model to boost their
scientific  research  capacity  and  foster  innovation,  establish  added-value  industries,  build
human capital, create jobs, and increase their competitiveness in global markets. But, are TPs
the answer? 
Technoparks, the new buzz word in emerging economies: What 
are they?
There  are  many  types  of  TPs  ranging  from business  parks,  incubators,  science  parks,
industrial parks to centers of excellence. For the purposes of this article, we will refer to TPs
as defined by the UK Science Park Association. 
“A Science Park is used to describe a property-based initiative which (i) has a
formal and operational link with a university or other higher educational institution
or major centre of research; (ii) is designed to encourage the formation and growth
of knowledge based businesses and other organizations normally resident on site;
(iii) has a management function that is actively engaged in the transfer of technology
and business skills to the organizations on site.”
The idea  of  setting  TPs close to  universities  emerged because  New Technology Based
Firms (NTBF) were created by scholars and university staff. They were designed to support
technology  transfer,  creation  of  businesses  and  jobs  and  enable  academics  at  the  local
universities to commercialize their research ideas (Storey and Tether, 1998).
While policymakers strongly believe in the efficiency of TPs, due to a lack of evidence
researchers tend to be more sceptical, especially in their effectiveness in developing countries.
Authors like Massey et al. (1992) argue that TPs have no economic effect except for the real
estate aspect. Colombo and Delmastro (2002) explain that the more the country is laggard in
high-technology  activities  the  more  the  TPs  tend  to  achieve  their  goals.  Since  emerging
countries like Tunisia  lack prerequisites for technology-based growth, TPs were seen as a
solution, especially for attracting technology based-industries and enterprises (Bakourous et
al.  2002).  Identifying  what  makes  TPs  successful  is  one  of  the  most  important  research
questions in this field. 
In  this  article  we  first  discuss  the  effectiveness  of  TPs  in  promoting  innovation  and
attracting technological firms in Tunisia.  Second, we evaluate the policies implemented in
Tunisia  in the management  of TPs. Third,  we critically analyse  the policies  implemented.
Finally, we present some policy recommendations to upgrade the existing TPs. 
2 In  this article we will neglect  the difference between Science Parks and Technoparks.  Technoparks are
supposed to be of a larger size (OECD, 1997).
3 The first Technopark was established in the United States around Stanford University in 1951. The second,
The Research Triangle Park, was based in North Carolina in 1959. European Parks emerged in the late 60s/early
70s in order to replicate the US success story. The first Technopark in France (Sophia-Antipolis) was created in
1969.  The first  Techno Park in  the  UK was  established in  1972 around Cambridge  University (Cambridge
Science Park). Since then, several parks around the world have been created, especially in emerging countries
aiming at technological catch-up and enabling their local universities to compete in the global innovation market.
Section two surveys the economic literature on TPs especially in emerging and developing
countries. Section three describes the case of Tunisia and gives an overview of the National
System of Innovation and the place of TPs. Section four provides the rationale  of TPs in
Tunisia and discusses their effectiveness. 
2. Technoparks: Do they Really Work?
Capturing the dividend of new technologies and innovation is a priority for all countries.
This can only be achieved if countries have a strong skill base (highly skilled researchers) and
a vibrant private sector creating new and dynamic firms. The model of TPs works because the
physical proximity between higher education institutions and New Technology Based Firms
(NTBF),  benefits  the  entire  economy  and  raises  scientific  research  and  innovation  in  a
country.  These  budding  NTBFs  need  support  such  as  access  to  technical,  logistical,  and
administrative resources as they struggle to gain a foothold in an increasingly competitive
market (Porter (1998)). 
Often, due to market failures, NTBFs need strong support from decision makers (Colombo
and Delmastro, 2002). Several theoretical arguments justify government interventions in TPs.
Oakey (1995), states that NTBFs produce positive externalities. In fact, the benefits to society
from  establishing  NTBFs  exceed  those  of  firms.  Castells  and  Hall  (1994)  list  three
motivations  for  the  establishment  of  Technoparks  or  Science  Parks:  (re)industrialisation,
regional development, and creation of synergies. Since most countries face strong concerns
with industrialisation and regional development, setting up TPs became a common answer to
these problems.  Colombo and Delmastro  (2002),  state  that  NTBFs are  sources  of  radical
innovation and unconventional technical approaches. By supporting these firms, governments
create new industry segments. In the case of emerging countries, TPs compensate for the lack
of basic preconditions for technology-based competition (e.g., missing markets, interactions
and skills). 
While  theoretical  arguments  are  well  established  and  accepted,  empirical  evidence  in
favour of TPs is still an open question. 
Ben Youssef  and Quéré (1999) explain  the  positive  dynamics  observed at  a  renowned
French TP “Sophia-Antipolis” in the quality of interactions between firms (cooperation and
competition) and in which multinationals played a crucial role. Most of the entrepreneurs and
founders of this TP were staff at big companies and/or sub-contractors. They also found that
the existence of local labor markets with high profiles is one explanation of the TP’s take-off.
Colombo and Delmastro  (2002) found that  Italian  TPs  were  successful  in  attracting  high
profile  entrepreneurs.  On-Park  firms  exhibited  higher  performances  compared  to  off-Park
firms in speed of growth and Research and Development (R&D). Colombo and Delmastro
suggest that the positive findings may be explained by the country’s level of technological
innovation.  “A possible  explanation  may reside  in  the  fact  that  Italy  is  laggard in  high-
technology  activities.” The  presence  of  Scientific  Parks  and TPs  may be  relatively  more
beneficial where the national innovation system is less advanced. Zucker et al (1998) have
found a positive interaction between universities and the Technopark of North California in
the field of biotechnology. Lindelöf and Löfsten (2002) compared the performances of firms’
on-Park  and  off-Park  in  Sweden  and  their  findings  show that  on-Park  firms  have  better
performances in sales growth and profitability.  Westhead and Storey (1995) found that the
probability for a firm to survive is higher if the firm has a link with a university. Since firms
that were established in a science park were more likely to have a link with a university, they
argue, that the role of the science parks in the UK may prove critical for the survival of small
high-tech firms.
From a technological policy perspective, these findings are helpful and can partly explain
why policymakers in developing countries strongly support TPs. 
Findings from Colombo and Delmastro (2002) research need to be confirmed by evidence
from  developing  countries  (assumed  to  be  less  technologically  advanced).  For  instance,
Massey  et  al.  (1992)  argue  that  science  parks  are  not  major  sources  of  technology
development. He asserts that geographical proximity between a university and a science park
accounts  for  very  little  in  promoting  technology  transfer.  Science  Parks  are  forms  of
prestigious real estate with few productive synergies generated. Similarly, Macdonald (1987)
suggests that  the premise that NTBFs have a competitive advantage due to their  strategic
location  near  a  university  is  flawed.  He  is  also  sceptical  about  on-Park  agglomeration
economies.  Bakourous  et  al.  (2002)  evaluated  the  performance  of  three  science  parks
established in the mid-1990s in Greece and found that they were not successful. The three
major factors explaining their findings are (i) due to their small size Greek firms do not fully
capture  the  dynamic  effects  of  TPs,  (ii) the  evaluation  was  made  a  few  years  after  the
existence of the Greek TPs. More time is needed to observe dynamic and positive effects; and
(iii) the existing policy for TPs Management  was not satisfactory (letting-in policy of the
parks). They report positive informal interactions between industry and local universities but
few formal ones. Eto (2005) questioned Japan’s policies towards the promotion of TPs outside
big  cities  (e.g.,  Tokyo,  Kyoto  and  Osaka).  Eto  argues  that  cultural  factors  are  the  main
explanation of the success of TPS. Firms are reluctant to set plants outside big cities where
there are no cultural facilities. Since there is no local dynamic labor market in these cities the
probability of success of setting TPs in these cities are low. His findings support Marshall’s
argument of existent local labour markets as a prerequisite for the development of TPs. In
their study, Chan and Lau (2005) found no evidence of benefits from networking in Hong
Kong-based  incubators,  and  argue  that  perhaps  networking  is  more  relevant  in  Western
contexts.  Radosevic and Myrzakhmet (2009), show that Kazakh TPs are not successful in
innovation and diversification of Kazakhstan’s economy. Firms within these TPs are oriented
largely towards the local market and operate in the traditional sectors. Williams (2013) show
the difficulties in setting the Russian Technoparks. Beside an active policy by the Russian
government and massive investments, “the policy failed to address the issue of the formation
of NTBF. There is no stimulus for small businesses to engage with R&D organisations to
commercialise the research results.  The formation of spin-off  firms still  has an accidental
nature.” (Williams, 2013 – p. 7).
These examples  show how difficult  it  is  to implement  TPs and how unpredictable  and
variable their results can be. These difficulties increase in the case of developing countries
where there are scarcity of funds, a short supply of qualified researchers, few internationally
competitive companies and a non-conducive investment climate. 
The experience of Tunisia is particularly interesting because (i) there was a real political
will to improve economic competitiveness by leveraging innovation; (ii) it is one of the first
countries in the African and Arab regions to set up a new Technopark in the nineties and (iii) it
is a developing country with no particular comparative advantage in ICT but who created a
very competitive TP in ICT. 
3. The Tunisian National System of Scientific Research and 
Innovation: an overview
In  the  late  1990s,  building  an  effective  National  System  of  Scientific  Research  and
Innovation  became  a  priority  for  the  national  government.  Tunisia  has  a  well-developed
public research system similar to most institutions in OECD States. But the system is fairly
centralised,  with the national  government  playing the lead role in science and technology
policy as well as in funding development and education initiatives (Arvanitis and Mhenni
(2010)).
Every five years,  a National  Development  Plan sets  the objectives  of the research and
innovation  policies.  Formally,  policy  planning  and  implementation  are  based  on  a  rich
network  of  policy  design,  implementation  and  advisory  bodies  as  well  as  on  evidence.
However, efficient coordination of stakeholders in the overall process has been problematic.
Between 2007 and 2012, a significant feature of the Tunisian R&D system was the high
share  of  funding allocated  to  infrastructure:  new Technoparks,  new research  centres,  and
access to international scientific information centres and databases. 
At 1.1% of GDP in 2009,4 Tunisia’s level of R&D is relatively high compared to other
Middle Eastern and African countries. The share of Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD) in
the national effort is estimated at 20% of the Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D (GERD).
Public research organisations and university research units are the main actors in the research
system, absorbing more than 80% of government allocations for R&D and delivering 67% of
Tunisian R&D. The government’s objective is to raise GERD at 1.5% of GDP by 2014, of
which nearly one third should be funded by the business sector. 
Education absorbs 20% of Tunisia’s State budget (7% of GDP). But in 2010, a mere 36.9%
of the population aged 18 to 24 had a tertiary level education and about one third of students
were enrolled  in  science  & engineering  fields.  This  figure more  than  doubled  in  the  last
decade. 12.8% of all university graduates have degrees in science and engineering (age 20-29)
close to the EU average. The government’s ambition is to accelerate the number of scientists
and engineers in Tunisia. However, a key issue to address is the quality of education.
In 2010, there were six researchers per 1000 total employment.5 However, only 10% of the
19600 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) researchers were employed on a full time basis and nearly
900 researchers were employed in private firms. Among those there are 8,000 master degree
unsalaried (mostly part time) students. This confirms the dominance of Higher Education in
scientific research. 
The most important barrier to R&D investment is low technology of Small and Medium
Enterprises (SMEs), dominating the economy with limited R&D investments and capabilities
(Arvanitis R. and M’henni H. (2010)). However, recent R&D surveys have identified about
100 companies  that  seem to  position  themselves  in  high  technology  niches.  The  existing
incentives have limited impact on the transfer of research results to the private sector and the
creation of new businesses through commercialisation (Koubaa et al. (2008)). 
Finally, the lack of private funding for R&D and innovation, venture capital and business
angel  investments  minimise  potential  research  commercialisation.  The figures  are  striking
when we examine economic results: less than 5% of Tunisian exports are industrial in high
technology sectors  (2010) and less  than  2% of  jobs  are  created  in  the  high-tech  services
(2008).
Strengthening the innovation system is  necessary if  Tunisian firms are to move up the
value chain and the technological ladder. Most Tunisian firms are SMEs that have limited
capacity  to  innovate  on  their  own.  These  firms  need  a  strong and  supportive  innovation
ecosystem. Critical reforms to strengthen Tunisia’s innovation ecosystem include (i) adopting
a  balanced  innovation  strategy,  (ii) enhancing  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  R&D
spending,  (iii) increasing  the  supply  of  adequate  skills  and  competencies  and,
(iv) strengthening the financing of innovation.
4 Data published by UIS 2012, but they must be considered as provisional since the last R&D survey in
Tunisia  was  conducted  in  2008.
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?
ReportId=3587&IF_Language=eng&BR_Country=7880&BR_Region=40525 
5 The number of researchers (FTE and HC) is considered as “overestimated” by UIS. The explanation is that
in Tunisia, are also considered as full time researchers all the students of the second year of Master’s degree. The
Frascati Manual did not exclude this type of counting particularly when the student dedicates all his time to
research activity. 
Direct  collaboration  between  researchers  in  public  laboratories/universities  and  private
firms  is  limited  and  cumbersome.  Three  factors  play  a  key  role  in  this  poor  outcome:
(i) limited demand from the private sector due to its predominant specialization in low value-
added sectors and sub-contracting; (ii) a mismatch between the nature of public research and
the needs of firms and (iii) complex bureaucratic procedures. 
Re-enforcing collaboration between universities, public research organisations and industry
is one of the most important priorities identified in the National Development Plan. This is
shown by the proliferation of relevant measures and the higher level of funds allocated to
support collaborative research. 
The idea of setting Technoparks could help Tunisia improve its innovation performance by
integrating  production,  research  and  education  in  the  same  place,  thus  allowing  a  fast
diffusion  of  new  technologies  and  innovation.  However,  international  experiences,  as
discussed  in  section 2,  shows that  TP are  complex  institutions  and success  is  not  always
guaranteed.
4. The Technopark program in Tunisia
In this section we explain the rationale of the Technopark policy in Tunisia and discuss its
performance. While Tunisia has decided to set up nine Technoparks, only one (El Ghazela)
seems to fulfil the prerequisites and is performing well.
4.1. The rationale of Technoparks in Tunisia
One of the main challenges facing the Tunisian economy in the next few years is to open
its economy to foreign exchange of goods, capital and services, particularly after the signature
of an Association Agreements with the  EU in 1995 which dismantled tariffs  for industrial
products in 2008. This process allowed the EU to become the first trading partner of Tunisia,
currently  accounting  for  about  75% of  Tunisian  exports  and  imports.  At  the  same  time,
Tunisia is one of EU’s best established trading partners in the Mediterranean region, and ranks
30th among EU’s trading partners in the World.  To be internationally competitive,  Tunisia
undertook some  economic  reforms  such as  modernisation  program of  Tunisian  industries
which included physical (tangible) equipment and (non-tangible) incentives mainly dedicated
to enhance the human capacities and to innovative activities.
In the mid-1990s, taking advantage of the new telecommunication era and the Internet
revolution, the government decided to create the first TP in Tunisia (the first for Africa and the
Arab  World).  The  8th Development  Plan  detailed  for  the  first  time  the  objective  of  the
programme, its main components and the budget allocated.
The ultimate objective was to create a “park of excellence” or a “specialised excellence
park”  where  researchers,  academics,  businessmen  and  senior  managers  will  work  closely
together  to  find appropriate  solutions  for  market  and societal  needs.  TPs will  serve three
essential  purposes:  (1) provide an impetus  for  R&D and innovation  in  the  private  sector;
(2) strengthen links between university (and public) research and the productive sector; and
(3) promote regional development.
In the 10th Plan of Development, the idea to create more Technoparks in the most important
cities of the country like Sfax, Sousse, Monastir and Bizert became apparent. Gradually, the
creation of Technoparks became the largest and the most ambitious Science and Technology
(S&T) programever launched in Tunisia. Setting up technoparks and/or business incubators in
different administrative regions constitutes a real challenge in a country where the number of
highly competitive companies on an international scale is very limited and where researchers
and  academics  do  not  have  the  culture  of  working  with  businesses  (Arvanitis R.  and
Mhenni H. (2012)). 
In the official documents of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, the
Technopark program mainly aimed to:
Develop high level competencies to manage innovative projects;
Support scientific research in the fields related to the national priorities and the needs of the global
economy;
Promote technological innovation;
Support  the  incubation  and  the  creation  of  innovating  companies  through  the  valorization  of
research results;
Promote innovating projects with high added value;
Polarize economic enterprises whose activities are based on R&D and Technological innovation;
Stimulate job creation, in particular for higher education graduates;
Improve the competitive capacity of the Tunisian company;
Promote public – private partnerships;
Foster Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
In  2000,  priority  areas  identified  by  the  Higher  Council  for  Scientific  Research  and
Technology  were  ICT,  Agriculture,  Food  and  Cereals;  Biotechnology;  Water  Resources,
Health and Energy. These priorities correspond to specific problems in Tunisia such as the
lack of water resources, increasing dependence on oil imports and the vertiginous rise of the
food prices in international markets. 
On the manufacturing side, textile, agri-foods, mechanics and electronic were the priority
as they were the most performing sectors with the highest export levels in the last decade. The
Technoparks program supportsthe national thematic priorities:
1. Mechanics and Electronics: Sousse Technopark
2. ICT and Multimedia: El-Gazala and Sfax Technopark
3. Water, Energy, Plant Biotechnology: Borj Cedria Technopark
4. Health, Human and Animal Biotechnology: Sidi Thabet Technopark
5. Textile: Monastir-El Fejja Technopark
6. Agri-food: Bizerte Technopark
7. Agriculture and forest resssources: Jendouba Technopark
8. Desert ressources: Medenine Technopark
9. Phosphates and other mineral ressources: Gafsa Technopark
The National Development Plan (2007-2011) is a roadmap for building national research
infrastructures. Investments allocated for the research sector during the 11th Plan amounted to
approx. €360m (TND680m). The tangible research investments are based on the rationale that
Tunisia  needs  to strengthen its  existing research base and build capacity  in  new areas  of
strategic importance in order to enhance the level of competition of the Tunisian firms in the
international markets.
The table below illustrates that nearly 17% of all investments allocated to the research
sector during the 11th Plan (2007-2011) were dedicated to the Technoparks program. 
Source: Economic and Social Development in Tunisia (2007-2011): toward a higher stage
of Growth. Project Data sheets. Ministry of Development and International Cooperation. 
Republic of Tunisia
4.2. Achievements of existing Technoparks
Tunisia has been investing in Technoparks since the late 1990s. The objective is to create
jobs and foster an innovation dynamics through an integration of research, production and
human capital around a specific product/sector in a specific geographical region. Through a
direct valorization of research, the technoparks could be an important tool for incubation of
innovative activities.
In 2012, Tunisia has one operational Technopark (El Ghazala) specialising in ICT and is
setting up six new Technoparks.  Three other Technoparks are in the phase of preliminary
study. The ultimate aim is to establish 10 Technoparks by the year 2016. These Technoparks
are spread throughout the country as follows:
Source: Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. www.mes.tn 
In  August  2007,  decisions  taken  to  enhance  the  governance  and  the  structures  of
Technoparks led to setting up management and exploitation companies. The participation of
banks and other public or private organisations is expected to facilitate the identification of
business opportunities and raise awareness among investors. These companies play the role of
a single liaison office supplying services to firms willing to be located in the parks (Arvanitis
and Mhenni (2012)).
Research infrastructure is associated with the creation/development  of research centres.
During the 11th planning period, many research centres have been renovated while some new
ones were built. This was the case of the four research centres in Borj Cedria Technopark in
the areas of water, energy, biotechnology and materials. In the same space a new Center of
Technological  Resources,  a  business  incubator  and a  Platform for  technological  resources
were built.  In  the  Technopark  of  Sousse  a  Microelectronics  and nanotechnology research
centre, an incubator and a Technology Resource Centre were built. In Sfax, the construction
of the new Centre for Research in multimedia computing and digital data processing is quite
advanced.
Since 2001, a programme of business incubators has been implemented in industrial zones
or within research centres and universities. Thirty six business incubators were created from
2001  to  2011,  but  some  of  them are  not  totally  operational.  More  than  2000 holders  of
projects benefited from the services of incubators in 2011 against 518 in 2005. The incubators
provide advice and auxiliary services to the project carrier, principally young entrepreneurs
and researchers,  from preparing  a  business  plan to  legal,  fiscal  and marketing  assistance.
Higher Education Institutions (HEI) and Public Research Institutions (PRI) incubators where
implemented to provide a framework to encourage the creation of spinoffs. The creation of
Technoparks in some regions of the country is expected to boost the business incubators’
programme and to attract innovative ideas. The programme benefits from the technical and
financial support of international entities like UNIDO and the European Investment Bank and
from countries through bilateral agreements like France for Bizerte TP and Monastir TP and
Japan for Borj Cedria TP. 
4.3. Relative success of ICT Technopark (El Ghazela)
By 2011, the Technopark of El Ghazela, specialised in Information and Communication
Technologies, housed nearly 90 companies (over three times the number of firms in 2003),
and employed about 2,000 staff. 60% of the production of these firms is exported mainly to
Europe but increasingly to African countries. 
The firm TELNET, a Tunisian success story is a start-up which became a very important
industrial  Conglomerate  in  the  country  expanding  its  activities  over  the  ICT  sector  in
10 years. Recently they setup a new airline company called Syphax). The Technopark can be
considered as a successful one and is presented as a good example for developing countries.
Morocco  and  Algeria  implemented  similar  technoparks  half  decade  after  the  Tunisian
experience. 
Several factors can explain this relative success of the El Ghazala Technopark. First, the
park successfully attracted multinationals early on. Microsoft, ST Microelectronics, Ericsson,
Alcatel Lucent and seven other leading ICT international companies are present in the park.
The  Diaspora  played  a  crucial  role  in  attracting  the  multinationals.  In  fact,  high  profile
managers working in these companies have convinced their board to go to Tunisia. They took
the lead in local management since they knew the Tunisian context. These companies work
closely  with  sub-contractors  and  manage  an  informal  network.  Second,  the  cooperation
between firms is high. They exchange information and share training. This dynamic was also
observed by Ben Youssef and Quéré (1999 and 2007) in Sophia-Antipolis  (France) which
explained its take off.
The Technopark as an institution offering services to local firms and coordinating their
actions seems to be efficient.  It hosts several annual meeting of the Euro-Med IT Forum,
Tunisian IT showroom, and African Events. It works closely with the government in order to
attract FDI in this sector. Implementation of the firms in the Park is based on real expertise
and potential for NTBF rather than political considerations.
The Technopark hosts two higher education institutions: the Telecommunications School of
Tunis  and the High Institute  of Technical  Studies  in Telecommunications.  Seven research
laboratories and units contribute to enhance the R&D activity in the Park. These institutions
work closely with other universities and research centres in Tunis. These exchanges guarantee
that the “local labor market” satisfies the needs of these firms. Cooperation between firms and
Higher Education Institutions is high. For example, in order to address the shortage of “high
profile ICT staff”, the firms within the network work closely with the University of Tunis and
other Private universities in order to set a special training session responding to their needs. 
Another explanation of the take-off of the El Ghazala Technopark is the cultural argument
explained by Eto (2005). Tunis, as a big city, offers a setting with cultural facilities. It is thus
easy to attract FDI and foreign firms are more able to convince their “foreign staff” to open
shop in Tunis.  Multinationals  were  able  to  implement  plants  in  Tunis  and a  local  labour
market is emerging in the ICT sector. This is not the case for other cities in Tunisia and to
other sectors.
However, the network is facing a big concern: “brain drain”. Even when they are offering
high competitive salaries, big European companies are hiring their staff. This situation leads
to the incapacity to the network to move upward in the value chain of ICT and to produce
more complex services and goods.
4.4. Limits of the Tunisian Policy approach of Technoparks
While the Technoparks seem to fulfil its objectives, the global approach of the Tunisian
government to Technoparks poses several problems. Nearly fifteen years after their effective
start  and  as  was  conceived  and  executed,  there  were  obvious  difficulties  with  their
implementation. 
First, the number of Technoparks is probably too high for a small developing country like
Tunisia. In the ICT industry all the conditions for the implementation of a Technoparks were
satisfied: existing local labor market, high level managers from the diaspora in the leading
multinationals, renowned universities in specific sectors). These conditions are not satisfied in
other domains (e.g., Biotechnology, Electronics). The five other existing Technoparks have no
enterprise working for the moment.
Second, Tunisia did not take into account the evolution of science parks and TPs. New
designs are emerging in the world. In particular, the substitution of the concept of TPs with
new models such as competence centres and clusters.  The first  model  is designed around
academic centres of excellence and they produce the most results (publications and patents)
and have more interconnections with industrial partners. The second model focuses on the
most  successful  industrial  clusters  in  the  country  and  supports  their  efforts  by  providing
research  centres,  technical  resources  centres,  higher  education  institutions  and incubators.
These new models avoid the additional costs associated with the development of large empty
spaces exploit the academic and industrial potential of the country. The creation of “ex-nihlo”
Technoparks is not successful in all the cases. While it is a success in ICT industries, it is not a
good model for other industries.
Third Tunisian TPs failed to attract high profile entrepreneurs and managers. The managers
of the TP projects, at least at their starting phase, were selected only based on their academic
skills  instead  of  their  entrepreneurship  skills  and  ability  to  mobilize  networks  of
“competencies” and skilled people. Following Javanovic’s (1982) seminal paper, the creation
of new firms may be the result of the subjective erroneous evaluation of the founder of his
(her) own capabilities. Most businessmen, even, new managers coming from the universities
are short-term profit seeking which is in conflict with building a national R&D and innovation
system, (more long-term profit perspective).
Fourth, the selection process in establishing the location of technoparks and their area of
expertise is questionable. The choices were based on political considerations rather than the
knowledge of the sector. For example, another ICT and Multimedia TP was set up in Sfax
while El Ghazala is working well. At the same time, Sfax is hosting the best research centres
in the country and probably in Africa in Biotechnology. But, the Biotechnology TP was set up
in Sidi Thabet where there is,. In the same premises, a recognized nuclear research centre
which may develop rapidly, given the international context and planned projects in the field of
civilian nuclear energy.
Fifth, there is a serious lack of skills and human resources in several TPs. Researchers are
not yet available in quality and numbers in some disciplines, thereby preventing the progress
of some projects related to research (e.g. such as cancer or nanotechnology). Since Tunisia
does not have the ability and the critical mass to develop a TP in a specialized field it is not
efficient use of resources to invest in these fields.
Sixth, the role of the government must be reconsidered. For TPs to be successful the the
private  sector  should  be  in  the  driver’s  seat  and government  should  serve  as  an enabler,
providing a conducive innovation ecosystem. In Tunisia, The government played a facilitating
role, especially in promoting adaptation and the diffusion of new technologies. Even in cases
where firms were created in government incubators, (e.g., Taiwanese electronics and Chilean
salmon), they were privatized as soon as they reached commercial viability. Government then
turned  its  attention  to  facilitation,  coordination,  and  regulation.  Instead  of  fostering
conglomerates, Taiwan’s government developed clusters of new firms each time an industry
transitioned to independent technological development. 
While  Tunisia  seems to generalize  clusters  (Technoparks)  to many areas and products,
international  experiences  suggest  that  some  prerequisites  are  necessary  for  success.  For
instance, the production process should be broken down into interdependent segments,  the
product must be easily transportable, and the location of the Technopark should be endowed
with a dense population of skilled entrepreneurs operating in a favourable investment climate.
5. Concluding Remarks
The objective of this article was to discuss the relevance and efficiency of TPs in Tunisia to
contribute to the debate on setting up TPs in emerging countries. 
Setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better
strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as
performing universities or industrial zones, leverage the diaspora more effectively, and match
the  location  of  the  TP with  the  cities’ area  of  expertise.  While  TPs  are  attractive  both
politically and among development professionals working in the area of science, technology
innovation, young entrepreneurs, scientists and researchers they might not produce the desired
outcomes if the necessary prerequisites are not in place. 
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